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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The purpose of the grand jury is to seek probable cause for trial;
its indictment is a formal accusation and in no way a final adjudication against the defendant. On principle, it would seem that rule
(3) is the sound one. 9 North Carolina, until the Levy decision, has
blandly followed the total-incompetency rule.' 0 The language of the
principal case manifests an inclination to hold with the modern trend
that in no case can the court examine the evidence, but precedent
forbade such a course; hence the distinction between disqualified witnesses and incompetent evidence. The writer's investigation has not
revealed that a like distinction obtains in any other jurisdiction. The
North Carolina court failed to complete its jump toward the liberal
view, and appears to have established a rule quite its own.

J.

G. ADAMS, JR.

Criminal Law-,Sufficiency of Indictment Under National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act.
The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act' makes it a crime to sell
any motor vehicle moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen. In
Grimesly v.U. S.2 an indictment, drawn up under this act, charging
the sale of a motor vehicle with knowledge that it had been transferred in interstate commerce and theretofore stolen was held insufficient, on the ground that it was not alleged that the automobile was
moving in interstate commerce and that it did not further state that
the automobile had been stolen.
The Sixth amendment provides, that, "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right-to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. ..

."

Congress, in order to limit the courts

in testing whether or not the accused has been sufficiently informed,
'As to fundamentals of the grand jury system, see 1 WIGmom, EvmENcF
(2nd ed. 1923) 20.
'When an indictment is found upon testimony, all of which isincompetent, or of witnesses, all of whom are disqualified, the bill will be quashed.
But where some of the testimony or some of the witnesses were incompetent,
the court will not go into the barren inquiry how far such testimony or witnesses contributed to the finding of the bill," State v. Coates, supra note 3.
The opinion of the principal case quotes the same extract, and points out that
since the Coates case actually concerned only disqualified witnesses the court's
statement of the rule to include incompetent evidence was so much too broad.
But if it be granted that all of the evidence heard by the grand jury in a given
case is incompetent, where is a logical basis for the distinction?
141 Stat. 324 (1919) ; 18 U. S. C. A. §408 (1927).
50 F. (2d) 509 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).
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has said, "No indictment ... shall be deemed insufficient nor the
trial affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in manner of
form only, which shall not tend to prejudice of defendant." a Most
of the courts are liberal in this matter and consider the true test
whether or not the information enabled the accused to make a good
4
defense.
In the principal case the majority view was that, for all the indictment showed, the automobile might have come to rest in Florida long
before defendant sold it. They were of the opinion that the essential
element was that the car be moving in interstate commerce and that
the indictment showed only an offense against the laws of the state.
The same question was raised in Katz v. U. S.5 and the court there
said the defendants should not escape punishment because they supposed that they were violating only a state and not a federal law.
The majority in the Grimesly Case were of the opinion that it should
be specifically stated that the car in question was stolen. Most of the
cases favor a more liberal view and hold it sufficient if it is alleged
that the accused knew the care to be stolen.0
As stated in the strong dissent the sole defense was that the defendant did not know that the car in question was stolen, and the case
'N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927) §4623.

"Statute made it a crime to knowingly and fraudulently import liquor into
the United States; indictment charging defendant with "unlawfully and feloniously" importing was held sufficient. Wishart v. United States, 29 F. (2d)
103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; indictment charging receipt and possession of goods
knowing the same to have been stolen from an interstate freight car was held
spfficient where the statute made it a crime to have in possession goods stolen
from an interstate freight car, Grandi v. United States, 262 Fed. 123 (C. C. A.
6th, 1920); Espionage Act (1918) 40 Stat. 553 (1918), 50 U. S. C. A. 33
(1927) made it a crime against the United States to make seditious statements
with the intent to hinder the operations of the Army or the Navy, indictment
in Shilter v. United States, 257 Fed. 724 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) drawn under this
act charged defendant with making seditious statements and was held insufficient because there was nothing to connect defendant's acts directly or indirectly
with the Army or the Navy; Sonnenberg v. United States, 264 Fed. 327 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1920) a later case under the same act held it was not necessary that
the words be spoken to some one in service; where the indictment drawn up
under the statute prohibiting the use of the mails to defraud and merely
charged defendant with having devised a scheme to defraud, held insufficient
in United States v. Hess, 124 U. S.483, 8 Sup. Ct. 571 (1888). By comparing
the dates of these cases we see that the modern courts are more liberal in their
views of the sufficiency of indictments.
'281 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).
'Isbell v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Wendell v.
United States, 34 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Brooks v. United States
(1925), 276 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345, 69 L. ed. 699; Heglin v. United States,
27 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Abraham v. United States, 15 F. (2d)
911 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
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was tried exactly the same as if the indictment had been letter perfect
or exactly like it will be on new trial. The dissenting opinion is more
7
in keeping with modern liberal decisions.

J. H. SEMBOWER.
Criminal Law-Tests of Legality of Searches and Seizures in
North Carolina and Federal Courts.
Four federal cases' decided within the past five months call attention to the conflict between the right of the state to make reasonable
searches and seizures and the individual right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Here are opposed the social need
that crime be repressed and the social need that law shall not be
2
flouted by the insolence of office.
Search warrants were unknown to the common law and "crept in
by imperceptible practice." 3 The Fourth Amendment embodies an
old common law principle 4 of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and though it does not apply to the states, 5
nevertheless all the states have included its equivalent in their constitutions. 6 The purpose of this protection, obviously, was not to afford
a shield to the guilty. That it should be so is an inescapable incident
to the preservation of the right to the people generally and affords a
challenge to the law enforcement machinery to solve and reduce this
result to a minimum.
If the situation is one where a lawful arrest may be made, then, it
is permissible to search the person and things under the control and
in the possession of the arrested person at the time of the arrest. 7
"AM. LAw INsT. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §159.
'Strom v. U. S., 50 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) ; U. S. v. Dean, 50 F.
(2d) 905 (D.Mass. 1931); U. S. v. Murray, 51 F. (2d) 516 (D. Md. 1931);

U. S. v. Ruffner, 51 F. (2d) 579 (D. Md. 1931).
'People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), 270 U. S. 657, 46
Sup. Ct. 353, 70 L. ed. 784 (1925) (certiorari denied).
'Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 2 Wils. K. B. 274 (1765).

"Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (C. B., 1763) ; Entick v. Carrington,
supra note 3.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S.465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65 L. ed. 1048, 13
A. L. R. 1159 (1921).
' N. C. CONST., art. 1, §15; Fraenkel, Concenting Searches and Seizwres
(1921) 34 HA~v. L. Rzv. 361.
"Strom v. U. S., supra note 1; Haverstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N. E.

625 (1925) ; People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923), 32 A. L.
R. 676 (1924) ; State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922) ; Hughes v.
State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588, 20 A. L. R. 639 (1922); State v. Deitz,
136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).

